





P1 P2 P3 合計
M1 20 24 28 72
M2 38 38 3 79
M3 40 39 42 121
合計 98 101 73 272
度数分布表
P1 P2 P3 合計
M1 20 24 28 72
M2 38 38 NA 79
M3 40 39 42 121
合計 98 101 73 272
１次
秘匿
P1 P2 P3 合計
M1 NA 24 NA 72
M2 NA 38 NA 79
M3 40 39 42 121
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(b) Tables with 25 cells




















(c) Tables with 36 cells






















(d) Tables with 49 cells
Figure 8. Distribution of the widths of effective feasibility intervals of primary suppressed cells.
Table 5. Latency of performing matching attacks. We take the average latency of 50 matching attacks
for each table size.




classifies tuple attributes into three categories: identifiers, quasi-identifiers (QIDs), and sensitive364
attributes, and defines the notion of equivalence class where all tuples in the same class possess the365
same set of values for the QIDs. The metrics of k-anonymity is syntactic in the sense that it requires that366
the size of every equivalence class is greater than a given threshold k. Many k-anonymity algorithms[22–367
26] are designed to achieve this property by generalizing values in QIDs while minimizing information368
loss.369
Wong et al [17] observes that most anonymization algorithms adopt the minimality principle to370
minimize information loss based on some criteria, and shows that sensitive information could be371
revealed from anonymized data based on l-diversity if an adversary knows that the algorithm divides372
tuples into equivalence classes depending on the values of sensitive attributes. They also propose373
the primary metrics m-confidentiality that guarantees that an adversary who additionally possesses374
the knowledge on the anonymization algorithm cannot have confidence of more than 1/m on an375
individual’s sensitive attribute value.376
Although the concept of m-confidentiality is similar to safety conditions on feasibility intervals,377
which are extended to support continuous or ordered values, there is no efficient and systematic way378
of solving the inverse problem to verify the conditions of m-confidentiality. It is in general necessary379
to execute the anonymization algorithm with all possible instances of input microdata. On the other380
hand, our contribution in this paper is to show experimentally that it is possible to eliminate a large381
portion of possible candidate tables that could be an input to the CSP algorithm by conducting the382
matching test.383
Jin et al [18], who are also motivated by the issue of information disclosure from l-diversified384
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